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ABSTRACT
Crew Resource Management Training Attitudes of United States Coast Guard Aviators
Greg A Stewart
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. John Ritz

This study presents an investigation of Coast Guard Crew Resource Management
attitudes and beliefs. The purpose of this study was to determine if there is a significant
difference in the Crew Resource Management attitudes and beliefs of pilots and crew
members. The study was guided by two research questions. Research Question 1 asked if
there was a significant difference between the CRM attitudes of enlisted flight crew
members and pilots. Research Question 2 asked if there was a significant difference
between the CRM attitudes of fixed wing HC-130 aviators and rotary wing H60 aviators.
Three hundred forty-three aviators from Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater, Florida,
were delivered the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire developed by Gregorich
and Helmreich of which 172 responded representing 50.1% of the population.

Data collected revealed that there was not a significant difference between pilots
and enlisted aircrew members on the questionnaire as a complete instrument, however
individual items did result in t-test analysis representing a significant difference.
Investigation of Research Question 2 provided data proving that there is a significant
difference between fixed-wing aviators and rotary-wing aviator’s attitudes and beliefs of
Crew Resource Management, particularly in the field of recognition of stressor effects.

These findings indicate that the current Crew Resource Management training program
employed by the United States Coast Guard is not meeting the learning objectives of all
members and requires revision.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes of Coast Guard Pilots and
Flight Crew Members on the topic of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training
programs currently employed by the United States Coast Guard. Multiple Human
Factors aspects within the scope of Crew Resource Management will be discussed to
include teamwork, situational awareness, and overall flight crew safety. Human error
accounts for over 80% of all Naval Aviation mishaps, and of those over 65% can be
attributed to at least one failure in CRM (CNO, 2001). Crew Resource Management is
widely accepted by the United States Coast Guard, as well as the world-wide aviation
community, to improve upon safety by eliminating distractors and negative behaviors in
pilots and crew members (FAA, 1998). The primary focus of the study is to determine if
the current CRM training conducted by the Coast Guard instills and enhances the desired
attitudes and behaviors of aviators and investigate any possible disparity by crew position
or airframe.
For this project, the scope will encompass the United States Coast Guard Aviation
Community. A sample population of 343 aviators from US Coast Guard Air Station
Clearwater will be given a questionnaire on cockpit management attitudes. Crew
Resource Management effectiveness is largely based upon crew coordination and
therefore a cross-section of multiple crew positions on multi-crew airframes will be
studied and compared. Participants in the study will consist of HC-130 aircraft
commanders, co-pilots, flight engineers, navigators, and load masters as well as H-60
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aircraft commanders, copilots, flight mechanics, and rescue swimmers. The data
collected will be examined to determine if there is a significant difference in the CRM
attitudes of individual crew positions and determine if the current training philosophy is
meeting the needs of all members.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to compare the attitudes on Crew Resource
Management practices of US Coast Guard enlisted flight crew members to those of pilots
to determine if the current blended training is appropriate.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This study was guided by the following research objectives:

RO1: Is there a significant difference between the CRM attitudes of enlisted flight
crew members and pilots?

RO2: Is there a significant difference between the CRM attitudes of fixed wing
HC-130 aviators and rotary wing H60 aviators?

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

The topic of Crew Resource Management has been a key component to pilot and
flight crew training in both the military and civilian sector for over three decades.
Modern aircraft have advanced to the point where it is extremely rare that mechanical
failure is the cause of an aviation mishap. In fact, it is widely accepted that between
60%-80% of all aviation accidents and mishaps can be attributed to human error
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(Freeman & Simmons, 1991). Recognizing that human error was now the leading cause
of aircraft mishaps, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in conjunction
with partners from the aviation industry, set forth to devise a training program to mitigate
the risks involved. Originally referred to as Cockpit Resource Management, the training
has evolved into its new crew concept through research that safety of flight is contingent
on all members of a flight crew working cohesively as well as ground crew members. In
addition to the evolution from cockpit to crew, CRM training has also advanced from a
program focusing on the engineering and psychology within the flight deck primarily
centered on instrumentation, to a broader multidisciplinary field. Modern CRM training
programs draw upon the methods and principles of behavioral science, engineering, and
physiology in an effort to maximize human performance and reduce human error
(Helmreich, Anca, & Kanki, 2010).

The United States Coast Guard understands the importance of an effective Crew
Resource Management training program. In 2010 the United States Coast Guard aviation
community endured its highest class A mishap rate since the birth of Coast Guard
aviation in 1916. Fiscal Year 2010 saw the Coast Guard suffer five class A Aviation
accidents and three class B accidents. Even more upsetting is the loss of ten
Coastguardsmen and women who lost their lives due to these accidents. Previously, the
Coast Guard had not lost ten crewmembers in a single year since 1982. Since that time
the Coast Guard had enjoyed a long period without loss of life. The Coast Guard has
completed an extensive review of Aviation Safety and an analysis on the trends in Coast
Guard Mishaps and made several recommendations, most notably in regards to
enhancements to Coast Guard Organizational Risk Management as well as Crew
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Resource Management (USCG, 2011). It is the goal of this study to determine if the
current training in place is meeting the needs of individual crewmembers to ensure that
transfer of the key concepts of Crew Resource Management are being met.

LIMITATIONS

The limitations of this study include the following:

1) The time since last annual refresher CRM training varies among
crewmembers.
2) The instruction provided to each member during training is standardized,
however there are differences in the delivery methods of individual
instructors.
3) The Cockpit Attitudes Questionnaire utilized was developed by Steven
Gregorich and Robert Helmreich in 1990.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions were made regarding this study:

1) The survey participants from Air Station Clearwater are representative of the
population of Coast Guard Aviators.
2) All survey participants have completed Crew Resource Management training
and/or a refresher course within a 12 month period.
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3) All survey participants are on flight orders and maintain a minimum of four
flight hours monthly to maintain qualification.

PROCEDURES

Data will be collected from pilots and aircrew on cockpit safety attitudes and
behaviors presented in Coast Guard Crew Resource Management training. This will be
accomplished using the validated Flight Deck Management Attitudes Questionnaire
developed by Steven Gregorich and Robert Helmreich (Gregorich, Helmreich, &
Wilhelm, 1990). The questionnaire will be given to the entire population of 343 Coast
Guard aviators at Air Station Clearwater Florida. The survey takers will be divided into
demographic categories of air crew position and aircraft type. Survey questions will be
asked using a five-point Likert scale for collection of data. The data will then be
analyzed utilizing t-tests to determine if there is a significant relationship between crew
positions and CRM attitudes and behaviors. The results from the aviators will determine
the evidence of a significant relationship between Coast Guard Pilot and Air Crew safety
attitudes and behavior in Crew Resource Management training.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following terms are defined to aid the reader:

Aircraft Commander– A highly qualified pilot who is in charge of the aircraft and the
crew during mission execution.
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Crew Resource Management– The effective utilization of all available resourceshardware, software, and liveware to achieve safe, efficient flight operations.

Human Factors– The scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of
interactions among humans and other elements of a system.

HC-130– Fixed wing turboprop cargo aircraft with four propellers operated in the US
Coast Guard with a standard seven man crew.

H-60– Medium range recovery helicopter operated by the US Coast Guard with a
standard four man crew.

Organizational Risk Management– A continual cyclic process which includes risk
assessment, risk decision making, and implementation of risk controls, which results in
acceptance, mitigation, or avoidance of risk.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Chapter I of this study provides an overview of Crew Resource Management and
how it impacts human factors and safety of flight components of aviation. The recent
mishaps in Coast Guard aviation were presented as well as the results of a mishap
analysis that identified Crew Resource Management as a key factor in the incidents.
Currently Coast Guard aviators participate in Crew Resource Management refresher
training annually, however it is undetermined if the training is meeting the needs and
requirements of individual members.

7

The research problem is to determine if there is a significant difference in the
attitudes and behaviors as they relate to Crew Resource Management of Coast Guard
aviators by crew position. 343 aviators from Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater
representing the various crew positions of the HC-130 and H-60 were given a survey
relating to safety attitudes and behaviors. The results of the survey were then analyzed to
determine if there was a significant difference between crew position attitudes and
behaviors in an effort to ensure that the training provided is meeting the needs of all
crewmembers.

Chapter II examines literature related to this study and presents an in-depth study
of Crew Resource Management concepts. Special attention is given to how the Coast
Guard implements CRM training as well as an analysis of CRM breakdowns in Coast
Guard mishaps. The Cockpit Management Attitude Questionnaire (CMAQ) survey
instrument developed by Gregorich and Wilhelm is discussed as well as an extensive
review of studies performed that have utilized the CMAQ.

Chapter III covers the methods and procedures used during the study of the
research problem. These include population, research variables, and use of the CMAQ
during the study. The sample population included 343 aviators from Air Station
Clearwater. Variables were represented by the attitudes and behaviors exhibited by
crewmembers on the CMAQ. The t-test was utilized after results were collected for
analysis.

Chapter IV provides an explanation of the findings of the research. Chapter V is
the final chapter in which the research is summarized, and conclusions are presented.
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The chapter concludes with recommendations regarding the future of the Coast Guard
Crew Resource Management training program.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This review is organized based upon the problem statement and research question
descriptors supporting Crew Resource Management curriculum including a brief history
of Crew Resource Management and the United States Coast Guard CRM curricula.
Coast Guard mishaps in which Crew Resource Management was a causal factor are
briefly reviewed. Finally, the instrument developed by Gregorich and Helmreich is
investigated as well as relevant research in which the instrument was utilized. The intent
of the review is to consider Crew Resource Management Requirements for the Coast
Guard and provide a thorough introduction to CRM and the assessment of CRM
behaviors and attitudes.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF CREW RESOUCE MANAGEMENT
CURRICULA
Crew Resource Management was first introduced to the aviation community
during a workshop conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in
1979 entitled Resource Management on the Flight Deck (Cooper, White, & Lauber,
1980). During the workshop, research was presented that identified human factors
aspects such as interpersonal communications, decision making and leadership as the
greatest factors in aviation accidents (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). In the
decades since the first generation of CRM training, there have been many different
training programs introduced worldwide in both military and commercial aviation. A
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comprehensive history of the evolution of Crew Resource Management will be discussed
in this section.
Frank Hawkins is credited with initiating the first course in human factors training
at KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines, in the late 1970s (Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010). The
first CRM program in United States aviation was introduced in 1981 by United Airlines.
This program and others that soon followed were modeled after a form of training termed
the Managerial Grid developed by psychologists Robert Blake and Jane Mouton.
Courses were titled Cockpit Resource Management as opposed to modern day Crew
Resource Management because popular belief at the time was that all decision making
and input should come from the pilots in the cockpit and that the crew provided little or
no benefit to the decision making process. These early CRM programs drew heavily on
the managerial approaches to cockpit management and included detailed investigation
into the managerial attitudes of the participants in the seminar style setting (Helmreich,
Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). The training programs focused heavily on psychological
testing and general concepts of leadership. Many programs included exercises outside of
aviation in order to illustrate concepts of teamwork as well as simulator training or Line
Oriented Flight Training where crews could develop interpersonal skills necessary for
teamwork. Most aviators recognized the need for CRM training, however a smaller but
substantial population resisted the new training referring to it as a “charm school” used to
manipulate their personalities and foster interpersonal relations without regard for
mission effectiveness (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).
Second generation CRM brought forth the change from Cockpit Resource
Management to Crew Resource Management. This new training enforced effective
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behaviors of both pilots and aircrew and established requirements for recurrent classroom
training as well as Line Oriented Flight Training. Findings from a second workshop
conducted by NASA along with the Military Airlift Command of the U.S. Air Force in
1986 highlighted the effectiveness of early CRM training programs and identified the
need to incorporate CRM training in initial and recurrent flight training (Orlady &
Foushee, 1987). Pan Am World Airways and Delta Airlines were among the first airlines
to incorporate new CRM training techniques that were team oriented in nature including
seminars on concepts such as team building, briefing strategies, situational awareness and
stress management (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). The concepts of decision
making strategies and breaking the chain of errors that may result in mishaps were
developed in the updated training programs. Second generation CRM training was more
readily accepted by the aviation community than its first generation predecessor, however
some critics still believed the training to be irrelevant to effective crew coordination and
deemed the training as “psycho-babble”.
In the early 1990s, a third generation of Crew Resource Management training was
developed. This third generation implemented a greater importance on developing the
interpersonal skills and behaviors of crew members outside of the flight deck. Human
factors issues and the emerging issues with flight deck automation and the human
machine interface were introduced in this training. In addition, advanced CRM training
for airmen responsible for the training and evaluation of pilots and aircrew was
introduced in third generation CRM (Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010).
Fourth generation CRM was introduced shortly after third generation CRM and is
highlighted by the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) introduced by the Federal
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Aviation Administration. The AQP is a voluntary program in which carriers are able to
develop their own custom training programs to meet their specific needs. The FAA must
approve the training developed by the carriers and the training is required to include
CRM and LOFT for all flight crew members as well as special training for instructors and
flight examiners. Fourth generation CRM programs also require that CRM is included as
an integral part of all aspects of flight training.
The fifth generation of Crew Resource Management focuses on a universal and
global rationale. In previous CRM training programs, the message was not exported
well. National culture conflicts made it difficult for US carriers to utilize programs
developed overseas, and programs developed in the United States and delivered to
overseas carriers were even less effective (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Fifth
generation CRM focuses on error management. Due to the fact that some error is
inevitable, the goal is to minimize error. This management is accomplished by a three
level defense including the avoidance of error, the containment of initial errors, and the
mitigation of the errors that occur and are not capable of being contained.
REVIEW OF COAST GUARD AVIATION MISHAPS
In 2010 the United States Coast Guard aviation community endured its highest
class A mishap rate since the birth of Coast Guard aviation in 1916. Fiscal Year 2010
saw the Coast Guard suffer five class A Aviation accidents and three class B accidents.
Even more upsetting is the loss of 10 Coastguardsmen and women who lost their lives
due to these accidents. Previously, the Coast Guard had not lost ten crewmembers in a
single year since 1982. Since that time the Coast Guard had enjoyed a long period
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without loss of life. In response to this dramatic increase, the Coast Guard completed an
extensive review of Aviation Safety and an analysis on the trends in Coast Guard
Mishaps and made several recommendations, most notably in regards to enhancements to
Coast Guard Organizational Risk Management as well as Crew Resource Management
(USCG, 2011).
The Coast Guard identifies class A mishaps as those accidents that cause damage
to Coast Guard aircraft in excess of $2,000,000 or there is a loss of life associated with
the accident. These values were increased on 1 October 2009 from the previous
threshold of $1,000,000. Class B Mishaps are those mishaps in which costs range from
$500,000 to $1,999,999, increased from the previous amounts of $200,000 to $999,999.
These amounts reflect the inflated costs of aircraft, in particular the modern avionics and
electrical systems integrated in aircraft. Previous to 2010, the Coast Guard maintained a
mishap ratio of less than one Class A mishap per year for over a twenty year span.
2010’s five Class A mishaps signaled a red flag to safety advocates and indicated a need
to reevaluate current practices (USCG, 2011). The following pages will document the
Class A mishaps suffered by the Coast Guard in 2010 and attempt to identify breakdowns
in CRM related to each accident.
On March 3, 2010, U.S. Coast Guard 6028, a Sikorsky MH-60T helicopter was
returning to its home base of Elizabeth City, NC, after providing security for the 2010
Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver, BC. Shortly after getting airborne from Salt Lake
City, Utah, following a scheduled stop there, the aircraft entered zero visibility
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and attempted to descend below what was
believed to be a thin cloud and snow layer. Upon descent, the aircraft lost power and
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collided with the snow covered mountainous terrain at approximately 40 MPH.
Fortunately, the 6028 was traveling with another Coast Guard helicopter. During the
crash however, the accompanying H60 did not have visual contact with the 6028 and all
communications systems were inoperable. Luckily the pilot on command (PIC) of Coast
Guard Helo 6028 was able to reach the other helicopter via the pilot’s cellular phone.
The airborne H60 then located the 6028 and landed within 300 yards of the crash site
where, along with mountain rescue, they provided assistance for the downed aircrew. All
five members of the 6028 aircrew survived the crash; however two members of the crew
sustained critical injuries, forcing one member to medically retire due to injuries
sustained in the crash. The aircraft was deemed to be damaged beyond economical repair
(Liesik, 2010).
Crew Resource Management breakdowns were apparent during the crash of Coast
Guard 6028. The crew lost Situational Awareness when what they believed to be a thin
cloud layer in actuality was IMC all the way to the deck. The crew was not prepared for
the high altitude flying and mountainous terrain in which they were operating. In
addition, when the aircraft lost power, no one on the crew was able to get off a distress
call to notify the company H60 with whom they were traveling. The crew was very
lucky to receive such fast response to what could have been a much worse scenario.
April 20th 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard 6523, an MH-65 Dolphin home based at
Air Station Detroit, was conducting night time boat operations with Coast Guard Small
Boat Station Port Huron. During a standard basket hoist evolution, while transitioning
from hover to forward flight, the aircraft impacted the water and sank into Lake Huron.
The aircraft reportedly entered an aggressive nose-up attitude, causing the tail to impact
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the water and become uncontrollable sending the 6523 into the lake. All three crew
members were able to egress the aircraft without serious injury.
Investigation by the Coast Guard revealed multiple breakdowns in Crew Resource
Management onboard Coast Guard 6523 at the time of the crash. The accident occurred
when the 6523 had completed hoist evolutions with the Coast Guard small boat from
Station Point Huron. The PIC directed the Co-pilot to handle all communications with
both the boat as well as air traffic control. In addition, the co-pilot was wearing night
vision goggles while the PIC was not and it was the responsibility of the Co-pilot to
assure safety during the flight. The 6523 had completed hoisting and requested that the
small boat stay on scene as they practiced low approaches to the water. It was at this
time that the PIC requested four times that the co-pilot disengage from hover
augmentation flight director mode. Due to his radio communications, the co-pilot did not
hear the PICs command until the fourth request, and disengaged as he was wrapping up
his conversation with the small boat. At this time the 6523 entered forward flight and
lost sight of the small boat. The PIC recognized he had no visual cues as to attitude and
attempted to take a quick look at his instruments. Upon returning his view outside the
cockpit, the PIC realized he had lost Situational Awareness and instructed the co-pilot to
assume control two times. The Co-pilot acknowledged but could not gain control of the
aircraft from its low attitude altitude and nose attitude before impact. The crew had
attempted to rush through their evolutions too fast and did not allow the proper time for
the copilot to handle all communications before moving to the next phase of the training
flight. This hurried approach led to the co-pilot disengaging hover before the two pilots
were prepared. In addition the copilot did not maintain an adequate level of awareness
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about the attitude of the aircraft before the pilot requested him to take control (Salerno,
2012).
April 29th 2010, U.S. Coast Guard 6581, another MH65 Dolphin based at Air
Station Humboldt Bay, while performing practice emergency procedures impacted the
runway and rolled at the Arcata Airport in Eureka, California. The crew was conducting
a practice fixed pitch tail rotor malfunction when the aircraft impacted the runway and
rolled. All crewmembers were able to egress the aircraft without injury. Investigation
later revealed that the aircrew decided together to change their training during the
evolution which contributed to the mishap. The PIC who was conducting the training
initially simulated a stuck left pedal which the copilot correctly diagnosed the reduced
rotor thrust as a stuck pedal. The two agreed that with a slight left crosswind, it may be
better to simulate a stuck right pedal. The PIC induced the right stuck pedal and the
copilot attempted to line up on the runway. During the approach, the copilot never lined
up properly on the runway, and the aircraft yawed excessively to the left. The copilot
attempted to slow the aircraft which only increased the yaw. At this time the copilot
advised the PIC that he intended to attempt a non-standard maneuver and follow the yaw
through a complete 360 degree turn of the aircraft and line up correctly. Shortly into his
attempt, the 6581 collided with the runway collapsing the right landing gear and
impacting the runway with the rotor blades before coming to a rest on the side of the
aircraft.
July 7th 2010, U.S. Coast Guard 6010, a Sikorsky MH-60T Jayhawk, struck
electrical transmission wires and crashed into the surf destroying the aircraft and fatally
injuring the Pilot in Charge and both aircrew members in the back of the aircraft off the
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coast of La Push, Washington. The aircraft was being ferried from Aviation Logistics
Command Elizabeth City, NC, to Air Station Sitka after its 60T upgrade. The 60T
upgrade involves a completely new avionics package to include moving map features as
well as a new sensor system. The crew had last stopped at Air Station Astoria, Oregon,
before proceeding on to Sitka, Alaska. Co-pilot LT Lance Leone was the only survivor
of the accident. On September 30th 2011, nearly a year and a half after the accident Lt.
Leone was charged with negligent homicide, dereliction of duty, and destruction of
government property in the amount of $18 million (Goldston, 2011). On December 7,
2011, Lt. Leone faced an Article 32 hearing in Juneau, Alaska, to determine if he would
face Court Martial. During the Article 32 investigation lead investigator Capt. Timothy
Heitsch argued that the aircraft had no reason to be traveling as low or as fast as it was.
Cockpit Voice Recorder data indicates that the crew was in fact sight-seeing. In addition,
the altitude alerter horn is audible several times during the flight (Goldston, 2011). The
crew lost track of the electrical transmission wires that run the 1900 feet from La Push,
Washington, out to James Island. The wires are owned and maintained by the Coast
Guard and have been the cause of two previous aviation accidents. LT Leone’s lawyer
has argued that the wires are improperly marked, although they are clearly identified on
the VFR Chart for the area. Although Leone had initially programmed his navigation
unit to safely avoid the wires prior to flight, his Pilot in Charge LT Sam Kreuger
descended from 240 ft. to under 115 ft. MSL before striking the wires (Bohrer, 2011).
Investigators argued that Leone was not actively navigating the aircraft and should have
alerted the pilot of the dangers. Leone was not charged in the death of LT Kreuger, only
the two crewmembers in the back of the aircraft. After thousands of hours of
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investigation, USCG RADM Ostebo determined that a Court Martial was not warranted
in this situation, although he did in his final report indicate that as the copilot, Leone
should have informed LT Krueger that he was operating the aircraft at too low an altitude
“under the circumstances of flight” (Bohrer, 2011). Although Leone was not charged
with any criminal misconduct, there is currently a special review board ongoing to relieve
LT Leone of all Coast Guard duties, therefore ending his career in the Coast Guard. A
memorial has been erected at Air Station Sitka, Alaska, where the three crew members
who lost their lives were stationed.
On December 29, 2009, the lives of seven United States Coast Guardsmen and
two members of the United States Marine Corps were tragically lost. Coast Guard rescue
aircraft 1705 was actively engaged in a Search and Rescue operation searching for an
overdue skiff in the vicinity of San Clemente Island, California. The Search pattern
assigned to CG 1705 had the aircraft operating in and out of warning area W-291. At
1854 a Marine Corps flight of four made up of two heavy lift transport helicopters (CH53Es) Warhorse 53 and Warhorse 50 along with two escort AH-1W Cobras V38 and V39
entered W-291. As is typical with flights of four operating as a single aircraft in respect
to navigation, only the lead aircraft WH53 had its Identify friend or Foe (IFF)
transponder activated and only the trailing helicopter Cobra V39 displayed its red anticollision light. The mishap helicopter, Cobra V38 was completely darkened ship and was
not squawking IFF. At 1907:37, roughly one hour after sunset and two minutes prior to
crash, the crew of CG 1705 received their first information of another aircraft operating
in the vicinity when their Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) displayed a
proximity target which was visually identified as Navy Helicopter Lonewolf 55 a US
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Navy SH-60 also operating in W-291 with its anti-collision light, position lights, and
search light illuminated. Lonewolf 55 was determined to be low and flying away from
the 1705 and determined not be a factor. At 1909:16, twenty seconds prior to collision,
the CG1705’s left hand scanner reported “traffic on the left, appears to be crossing”.
Later recreation by investigators determined that the traffic reported by the left hand
scanner was likely the trail cobra V39 which was displaying its red anti-collision light,
but was approximately one mile abeam the CG 1705 at the time. Investigators
determined that it is highly unlikely that the scanner ever saw the Mishap helicopter V38
which only had its green NVG compatible position lights illuminated ascend underneath
the aircraft. At 1909:53, four seconds before impact, the Flight Engineer of CG 1705
unemotionally called “traffic, flight of two going in front”. One second later, the CG
1705’s TCAS issued an aural warning of “traffic, traffic” meaning it had acquired a
transponding aircraft which could only have been WH-53, the only member of the flight
of four squawking TCAS at the time, three-quarters of a mile ahead (Brice-O’Hara,
2010). At 1909:57, Coast Guard Rescue 1705 collided with Marine V39 killing all nine
aviators involved in the accident. Later investigation indicated that flight of four had
initiated a right hand climbing turn in an effort to create space between themselves and
the Navy SH-60 Lonewolf 55. This brought the mishap Cobra V38 directly into CG
1705. The Coast Guard C-130 and Marine Cobra were never located.
August 3rd of 2010, Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Sally
Brice-O’Hara signed the Final Action on the Administrative Investigation completed by
the Coast Guard. In the report she stated that no single factor or individual act or
omission caused this mishap. It was the product of a tragic confluence of events, missed
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opportunities, and procedure/policy issues in airspace where most aircraft fly under a
“see and avoid” regime wherein individual aircraft deconflict themselves (Brice-O’Hara,
2010). In the report, Vice-Commandant Brice-O’Hara did however state that FACSFAC
San Diego by not providing operational priority to Coast Guard Rescue 1705 was a
contributing factor in the accident. FACSFAC SD is a US Navy Air Traffic Control
facility based at Naval Air Station North Island, California, tasked with providing offshore ATC control and surveillance as well as management of the Southern California
offshore military operating area to include W-291 which is denoted as “special use
airspace” wherein military aircraft are confined and civil aircraft are given limited access.
As a result of the investigation, Vice-Admiral Brice-O’Hara recommended in her final
report that the Commander of Naval Aviation Forces review the SAR prioritization
policies so that all FACSFAC controllers enforce operational priority and de-confliction
for all SAR cases. An additional contributing factor to the accident noted in the Coast
Guard report was the USMC flight of four formation size and aircraft lighting. Although
not in violation of regulation, the fact that only one of the aircraft in formation was
illuminated, and the formation had spread out so far, afforded CG 1705’s flight crew little
opportunity to see and avoid the mishap aircraft V-38 (Brice-O’Hara, 2010). This caused
a lack of situational awareness on the part of the crew of CG 1705 due to the
misperception that the TCAS alert received was the Lonewolf 55. In addition the poor
execution and formation of the flight of four was a contributing factor in the collision. In
fact at the time of the collision, V39 pilots estimated they trailed WH53, the lead CH-53E
by 10-12 rotor lengths or approximately 500-1000’ when in actuality they were nearly
150 rotor lengths behind, roughly 7500’ or 1.42 statute miles, much greater than the
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briefed five rotor diameters briefed prior to the flight. Her recommendations include
expediting the push for US Coast Guard aircraft to become NVG compatible so that
traffic aircraft as well as other obstacles to flight are more visible in low light.
United States Navy Admiral Patrick Walsh, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet,
and an aviator himself, took a more blunt approach in his statements. In the Navy’s
report, Admiral Walsh states that “this mishap and tragic loss of life that resulted was
entirely preventable” (Coast Guard Digest, 2010). In the report he states that although
both mishap aircraft were operating under VFR rules with the responsibility to maintain
aircraft separation, that more rigorous airspace management advisory procedures along
with better use of communications protocols by controllers and aircrews could have
prevented the accident. In fact San Diego FACSFAC was in regular contact with CG
Rescue 1705 for nearly two and one half hours as the aircraft transitioned in and out of
the warning area and had vectored the aircraft around other activity. SD FACSFAC was
also in contact with the Marine flight of four, however neither was ever informed of the
presence of the other. Admiral Walsh goes on to state that resulting from this
investigation, all commands possessing air traffic control responsibilities shall review all
policies and procedures to ensure compliance and standardization. In the final report
submitted by the United States Navy in the findings of fact heading provide a troubling
picture, and portray a watch stander who did not understand the policies and procedures
in place (Coast Guard Digest, 2011). Both the final report for the Coast Guard as well as
the Navy share that a large factor in the accident was that the FACSFAC SD controllers
were operating under conflicting and inadequate written policies and procedures which
were misinterpreted by controllers. Three errors were noted in the handling by

22

FACSFAC SD. First, they did not prioritize the actual Search and Rescue mission above
scheduled training events. Second, they did not prioritize their aircraft handling, and
lastly that they failed to provide safety alerts and traffic advisories to the crews operating
in W-291.
In addition to being unfamiliar with the responsibilities they had to the two
aircraft operating in warning areas under their watch, it seems that the controllers at
FACSFAC SD also were unaware of their own operating procedures after an accident
occurs. Although the Radar Branch Chief reported to the watch floor within thirty
minutes, the Facility Watch Supervisor and Approach Controller were not relieved of
duty until more than two hours later (Coast Guard Digest, 2011). The Radar Branch
Chief collected statements from both the AC and FWS and then sent them home unaware
that the FACSFAC SD standard operating procedures stated that the watch standers were
required to report to the flight surgeon immediately, regardless of whether the watch
standers directly caused the accident or were a contributing factor. This becomes even
more interesting after learning that the Facility Watch Stander had dental work completed
earlier in the day that involved the use of Novocain. This creates speculation that perhaps
the FSW had taken a pain reliever that may have affected his reaction time and judgment.
Upon review of the files of the controllers on duty at FACSFAC SD that evening, it was
discovered that the FWS, the individual who had dental work that evening had only three
months prior had his NOCAL sector qualification suspended. On 27 July 2009, the
qualification was pulled for “failure to apply proper handoff procedures and ensure
proper separation from adjacent airspace”. He completed the remediation syllabus and
was re-qualified to stand watch stander duty. FACSFAC SD continues to take the
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approach that their controllers were not the causal factor in the accident, and therefore
refused to hand down any punitive action against the controllers. However, corrective
measures were installed, as the Approach Controller and Facility Watch Stander were
suspended from all Air Traffic Control duties on October 30, 2009.
Four months after the accident in a periodic Air Traffic Control NATOPS
evaluation investigation was conducted at FACSFAC SD. In the report, the investigator
called the unit “satisfactory” and noted that young controllers appeared loose on radar
coordination and that traffic calls needed work. The investigator concludes his report
with a harsh criticism of FACSFAC SD. He states that on October 29, 2009, the AC
failed to provide an appropriate level of service to CG 1705 upon its final return into W291 airspace. The aircraft was not radar identified upon re-entry, and a traffic advisory
reporting the presence of the USMC flight of four should have been passed. In addition,
the investigator concluded that the USMC flight of four was also given an inadequate
level of service. The USMC crew was never informed that the Coast Guard was
conducting an active Search and Rescue case. The USMC aircraft was never in radar
contact due to a late squawk assignment and lack of confirmation that the assigned code
was activated.
During the twenty-seven year period from 1983 to 2009, the Coast Guard
averaged only one Class A mishap per year. The stability of these low mishap rates
lulled the United States Coast Guard aviation program into a sense that there was no need
to update the current service safety policies and programs. The series of mishaps in 2010
led to a unique examination of Coast Guard aviation to determine what if any common
factors are present in the mishaps, and what we can do to prevent another. In May of
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2010 while in the midst of four class A mishap investigations and one class B
investigation, the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commandant for operations jointly chartered
the Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan. This group was then divided into five
Analysis Components: Occupational Hazard Analysis, Data Set Analysis, Aviation
Leadership Improvement Focus Group, Booz Allen Hamilton Independent Analysis, and
Coast Guard Aviation Association. The results of these Analysis Boards were a total
reworking of the Coast Guard Organizational Risk Management program and the Crew
Resource Management program. The previous Organizational Risk Management
program is now over twelve years old and relied heavily upon crew experience and was
highly subjective. The new ORM program centers on a standardized risk assessment tool
and a comprehensive ORM training program. Crew Resource Management has
traditionally been a very strong and well supported program in the US Coast Guard. The
Analysis components determined that while CRM was intended to be delivered in groups
of pilots along with aircrew, the training had become separate, and rarely where pilots
and crew participated in the same training. In addition to correcting this discrepancy, the
Coast Guard has instituted several C schools in Aircraft Accident Investigation,
Investigation Management, and Safety Management Systems. These new programs,
accompanied by a safety conscious environment are the cornerstones to the new safety
program in the Coast Guard
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIORS TESTING
With any training program it is necessary to evaluate the outcome in order to
validate the training and ensure that the program is meeting its intended goals. Goldstein
(1993) defines training evaluation as the systematic collection of descriptive and
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judgmental information necessary to make effective training decisions related to the
selection, adoption, value and modification of various instructional activities. The
evaluation of a training program such as Crew Resource Management is acknowledged as
being very difficult due to results being largely based upon the attitudes and behaviors of
those who have completed the training; however, there are many benefits of the testing
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1989). First among these benefits is determining if the goals and
objectives of the program are appropriate to achieve the desired outcome. Second, the
evaluation can determine if the content and delivery of the subject matter are appropriate
to achieve the overall program goal. Third the evaluation may help to maximize the
transfer of training. Finally, it may be used as a tool to indicate areas at both the
individual and team level that require improvement or complete overhaul.
First developed in 1976, Kirkpatrick’s typology remains the most popular
framework for assessing the effectiveness of training programs (Salas et al., 2001).
Kirkpatrick’s typology utilizes a multi-level approach in the evaluation of training
programs consisting of four levels: (1) reactions, (2) learning, (3) behaviors, and (4)
results. The first level of evaluation, reactions, is a measure of the trainee’s impression of
the course. Kirkpatrick has identified two primary reasons for evaluating customer
reaction. First, the decisions of management are often based on the feedback of trainees
(Kirkpatrick, 1996). Training programs are very expensive and occupy many man-hours,
therefore it is extremely important that the programs meet the needs of trainees.
Secondly, reactions are believed to influence learning. Trainees are much less likely to
gain the desired knowledge, skills and behavior if they feel that the training was of little
value (Kirkpatrick, 1996). The second tier of evaluation in Kirkpatrick’s typology is that
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of learning. Learning is generally broken into two components: learned skills and learned
attitudes. Skills are most commonly assessed by administering some form of knowledge
assessment to determine if the individual has learned the desired material. In aviation,
this assessment is often done by Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). LOFT is a
scripted or scenario based training evolution utilizing a training simulator for the purpose
of training flight crews with an emphasis on Crew Resource Management (Kanki,
Helmreich, & Anca, 2010). The assessment of attitudes is most commonly conducted by
the use of a survey. For Crew Resource Management, the most common and validated
tool for attitude assessment is the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ)
(Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990). The CMAQ has been validated as an
effective predictor of outcome factors in the field of Crew Resource Management
(Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & Russinin, 1986). However, there are scholars who
dispute the validity of the CMAQ in the modern aviation environment citing the lack of
key cognitive aspects being addressed such as situational awareness, decision making,
and workload management (O’Connor et al., 2002). The greatest goal of CRM training is
to change crew members’ attitudes and make them aware of the pitfalls and negative
behaviors that can jeopardize safety. For this reason, the evaluation of attitude learning is
an integral component in the overall assessment of the training. The third tier of
evaluation in Kirkpatrick’s typology, behavior deals with examining whether the training
has developed the desired behaviors for effective CRM. The observation of behaviors,
much like learned skill is best performed by a structured LOFT. Surveys such as the
CMAQ also have proven to be effective tools in recognizing behaviors in crew members.
The fourth and final tier of Kirkpatrick’s typology is results. The evaluation of results is
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a measure of the effectiveness of the training on the organization as a whole. Measuring
the effectiveness of Crew Resource Management training during a mission is difficult due
to the many variables that are involved (O’Connor et al., 2002). One accepted method of
analyzing the results of CRM training on the organization is by analyzing historical
mishap and safety data. In a study by Alkov (1989), there was a noted decrease in
mishap rates as a result of CRM training. In another study, Kayten (1993) cited multiple
examples of good CRM practices from National Transportation Safety Board reports that
helped to limit or prevent accidents where human or mechanical error existed.
SUMMARY
Crew Resource Management has been proven to reduce the prevalence of human
error in aviation mishaps (Alkov, 1989; Kayten, 1993). As aircraft become more reliable,
and more reliant upon automation, the human component and potential for error must be
minimized. The extremely high mishap rate experienced by the Coast Guard in 2010 has
uncovered a threat to the safety of Coast Guard aviators. Coast Guard Crew Resource
Management has been revamped, but is there a one size fits all training that is best for
both pilots as well as crewmembers? The Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire
is the proven instrument of choice for validating CRM training and analyzing the
attitudes and behaviors of aviators (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990). This study
will evaluate the differences in regards to behavior and attitudes in airmen of multiple
crew positions as well as any differences between rotary and fixed wing aviators.
Chapter III will address the methodology of the study. A review of the population,
survey instrument, and method of analysis will be presented
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
This chapter covers the methods and procedures used in this descriptive survey
study designed to determine Coast Guard aviator’s Crew Resource Management attitudes
and behaviors. The methods and procedures include defining the population for the study,
describing the instrument’s design, explaining the methods of data collection, and
addressing the statistical analysis methods used to treat the data and develop meaning.
Population
Population for this study is based upon the number of aviators that currently fly as
pilots and crew members attached to the Coast Guard’s largest Air Station in Clearwater,
Florida. The population for the study consisted of pilots, co-pilots, and crewmembers
assigned to both the HC-130 Hercules turbo-prop fixed-wing aircraft and the H60
helicopter. There were 343 total Coast Guard aviators that made up the sample
population at Air Station Clearwater.
Instrument Design
An electronic survey was developed utilizing the validated Cockpit Management
Attitudes Questionnaire developed by Gregorich, Helmreich, and Wilhelm (1990). The
survey was designed to measure the attitudes and beliefs of aviators on the topics of flight
safety, flight management, and Crew Resource Management. It is comprised of 25
questions answered utilizing a five-point Likert scale to rate the individual’s opinion of a
given statement regarding cockpit management from the choices of strongly disagree,
disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. A copy of the survey is provided in
Appendix A.
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Methods of Data Collection
The survey was emailed utilizing the Coast Guard email server along with a cover
letter detailing the study to all aviators currently on flight orders at Air Station
Clearwater. The cover letter email provided the survey purpose, addressee response
encouragement, human subject protection measures, and the notice of agency. The email
also included electronic survey instructions. Respondents were made aware that
participation in the survey was optional, but that the success of the study depended on
their contribution. While there is no direct benefit to any participant, the goal of the
study is to improve the safety program for all aviators with the Coast Guard. All
responses were collected by the survey program and coded as to provide anonymity to all
participants. Respondents were asked to complete the survey within ten days. A followup email was sent one week after the initial email including the link to the electronic
survey. The electronic survey collected the data anonymously and provided aggregated
responses to the researcher. A copy of the cover letter is included as Appendix B.
Statistical Analysis
Electronic survey responses were received by the researcher and organized by
question. Responses to each question were calculated based upon crew position and air
frame. T-tests comparing the sample responses on each item within three factors were
then conducted to determine if there is a significant difference between the cockpit
management attitudes of crewmembers as compared to pilots as well as t-tests to
determine if there is a significant difference between the cockpit management attitudes of
HC-130 aviators as compared to H60 Aviators. Statistical analysis was then utilized to
answer the two research questions.
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Summary
Chapter III covered the methods and procedures used to conduct the study of
cockpit management attitudes of Coast Guard aviators. The methods and procedures
included the population, survey instrument design, methods of data collection, and
statistical analysis of the survey responses. The sample was the aviators currently on
flight orders assigned to Air Station Clearwater, Florida. The instrument design was
validate by the research of Gregorich, Helmreich, and Wilhelm (1990). The methods of
data collection consisted of an email via the Coast Guard message system to the sample
containing a link to the electronic survey that collected and reported the data upon
completion of the survey period. Respondents were made aware that participation was
optional and all information collected would remain anonymous. Statistical analysis of
the question response data using descriptive methods was accomplished utilizing
independent t-tests to answer the study’s research questions. Chapter IV, Findings,
presents the survey data and analysis of that data.
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Chapter IV
Findings

The problem of this study was to compare the attitudes on Crew Resource
Management practices of US Coast Guard enlisted flight crew members to those of pilots
to determine if the current blended training is appropriate. This chapter will consist of an
analysis of each research question proposed for the study. The data collected will be
analyzed to determine if there is a significant difference between the Crew Resource
Management attitudes and behaviors of Coast Guard pilots and crew members. The
second section will investigate if there is a significant difference between the Crew
Resource Management attitudes and behaviors of Coast Guard C-130 fixed wing aircrew
members and H60 helicopter aviators.

Respondents

Respondents for this study are from the population of aviators stationed at Coast
Guard Air Station Clearwater. One hundred seventy-two members out of a population of
343 aviators at Air Station Clearwater responded to the Cockpit Management Attitudes
Questionnaire representing a 50.1% response rate. Among those that responded, 40 were
pilots and 132 were aircrew members. Respondents consisted of 92 C-130 fixed wing
aviators and 80 rotary wing helicopter aviators.

Crew Position

Research Question 1 of this study asks if there is a significant difference between
the Crew Resource Management attitudes of pilots and aircrew members. Questionnaire
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items were separated into three factors: communication and coordination, command
responsibility, and recognition of stressor effects. The first factor, communication and
coordination, investigates crew attitudes pertaining to teamwork and individual crew
responsibilities. Factor 2, command responsibility, focuses on the leadership needs for
the crew as well as the belief in the appropriateness of shared responsibility of crew
members in flight operations. The final factor, recognition of stressor effects, includes
items related to consideration and possible compensation for stress due to situational
adversity. Analysis of cumulative responses from each of the three factors indicate that
there is no significant difference between the responses of pilots and crew members on
the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire for any factor. However, individual
item t-test results did indicate a significant difference at the 95% confidence interval for
multiple items. Each individual factor is analyzed in the following section.

Communication and coordination. Factor 1, communication and coordination
analysis, revealed a t-test p value of .0848 which is not statistically significant at the 95%
confidence interval. With a sample size of 40 pilots and 132 crewmembers, we use the
normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since
the obtained t-ratio of 1.73 is less than 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference
between the means is not significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the
researcher cannot assume that pilots and crewmembers have differing attitudes towards
communication and coordination factors of Crew Resource Management. Factor one is
made up of eleven items which cumulatively do not represent a significance difference
between pilots and aircrew members CRM attitudes and behaviors, however, four items
did exhibit a significant difference between the two populations. Item 8 asked respondent
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opinion of the statement “pilots should be aware of and sensitive to the personal problems
of their crew members”. With a sample size of 40 pilots and 132 crewmembers, we use
the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference.
Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.18 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed
difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the
researcher can assume that pilots and crewmembers have differing attitudes in regards to
the pilot’s responsibility to be aware and sensitive to the personal problems of crew
members. Item 10 asked respondents opinion of the statement “The pilot flying the
aircraft should verbalize plans for procedures or maneuvers and should be sure that the
information is understood and acknowledged by the other crew members”. Again, pilots
responded higher on this item with all 40 pilots responding unanimously that they
strongly agreed with this statement. With a sample size of 40 pilots and 132
crewmembers, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the
significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.48 exceeds 1.97, we can
assume that the observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of
significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that pilots and crewmembers have
differing attitudes in regards to the pilot’s responsibility to verbalize plans for procedures
or maneuvers and the requirement that information passed is comprehended by all crew
members. Item 22 states “Effective crew coordination requires crew members to take
into account the personalities of other crew members”. Yet again, pilots answered
strongly agree more often than crew members. With a sample size of 40 pilots and 132
crewmembers, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the
significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.79 exceeds 1.97, we can
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assume that the observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of
significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that pilots and crewmembers have
differing attitudes regarding whether effective crew coordination requires crew members
to take into account the personalities of other crew members. The greatest difference
between the attitudes of pilots and crew members was indicated on Item 23 of the
questionnaire which stated “The Aircraft Commander’s responsibilities include
coordination of cabin crew activities”. Pilots overwhelming responded higher on the
Likert scale than crew members with a mean score of 4.62 as compared to the crew
members score of 3.85. With a sample size of 40 pilots and 132 crewmembers, we use
the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference.
Since the obtained t-ratio of 4.98 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed
difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the
researcher can assume that pilots and crewmembers have differing attitudes regarding the
duties of the Aircraft Commander as they pertain to cabin crew activities. Data collected
from pilots and crew members on factor 1 of the questionnaire titled communication and
coordination is included in Table 1.
Command Responsibility. This factor of the questionnaire focuses on the

leadership needs for the crew as well as the belief in the appropriateness of shared

responsibility of crew members in flight operations. Like factor 1, this factor did not
reveal a significant difference cumulatively; however two of the items did uncover a
significant difference in the beliefs of pilots and crew members on the topic of command
responsibility. Item 9 states “The Aircraft Commander should take control and fly the
aircraft in emergency and nonstandard situations”. On this item aircrew agreed more
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Table 1
Pilot and crewmember attitudes of Communication and Coordination.
Item #
FACTOR
1
2
6
7
8
10
12
14
16
21
22
23
Totals

PILOTS
M

40
SD

CREW 132
M
SD

t-ratio

4.23
4.85
4.77
4.46
5
4.85
3.38
4.77
4.85
4.54
4.62
4.57

1.3
0.55
0.43
0.66
0
0.38
1.3
0.44
0.38
0.52
0.65
0.6

4.22
4.81
4.89
4.15
4.56
4.72
3.67
4.6
4.6
4.11
3.85
4.33

0.04
0.45
1.91
2.18
2.48
1.42
1.43
1.35
2
2.79
4.98
1.73

1.22
0.48
0.32
0.82
1.12
0.54
1.07
0.76
0.76
0.93
0.91
0.81

t-test
p value
0.9644
0.6562
0.058
0.0303
0.0141
0.1579
0.1558
0.18
0.0468
0.0059
0.0001
0.0848

often than pilots with a mean score of 3.85, while pilots averaged a 3.38, closer to neutral
score on the five-point Likert scale. T-test results indicated a p value of .0175
representing a significant difference at the 95% confidence interval. With a sample size
of 40 pilots and 132 crewmembers, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to
determine the significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.40 exceeds 1.97,
we can assume that the observed difference between the means is significant at the .05
level of significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that pilots and crewmembers
attitudes differ significantly in regards to what circumstances require the aircraft
commander to take control of the aircraft. Item 18 saw pilots answer more favorably to
the statement “Overall, successful flight deck management is primarily a function of the
Aircraft Commander’s flying proficiency”. Using a sample size of 40 pilots and 132
crewmembers, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the
significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.03 exceeds 1.97, we can
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assume that the observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of
significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that pilots and crewmembers have
differing attitudes regarding successful flight deck management and its relationship to
pilot flying proficiency. Factor 2 results are indicated on the following page on Table 2.
Table 2
Pilot and crewmember attitudes on command responsibility.
Item #
FACTOR
2
9
11
15
18
Totals

PILOTS
M

40
SD

CREW 132
M
SD

t-ratio

t-test
p value

3.38
2.77
2.15
3.08
4.57

.96
1.36
1.34
1.66
0.6

3.85
2.59
1.89
2.56
4.33

2.40
.71
1.20
2.03
1.73

0.0175
0.4792
0.2302
0.044
0.0848

1.12
1.42
1.15
1.34
0.81

Recognition of Stressor Effects. The factor entitled recognition of stressor
effects featured items related to consideration and possible compensation for stress due to
situational adversity. This factor did not present a significant difference between the
attitudes of pilots and crew members cumulatively or on any individual item. Results of
the data analysis of factor 3, recognition of stressor effects is included on Table 3.
Table 3
Pilot and crewmember attitudes on recognition of stressor effects.
Item #
FACTOR
3
13
17
24
25
Totals

PILOTS
M

40
SD

CREW 132
M
SD

t-ratio

t-test
p value

3.54
2.85
3.62
3.62
3.41

1.13
1.14
.96
1.19
0.6

3.3
2.96
3.3
3.89
4.33

1.10
.47
1.51
1.46
.24

0.2725
0.639
0.1327
0.1461
0.8131

1.23
1.34
1.23
.97
0.81
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Designated Airframe
Research Question 2 investigates whether there is a significant difference in the
Crew Resource Management attitudes between fixed wing aviators and rotary wing
aviators in the United States Coast Guard. This study specifically investigates the
attitudes of fixed wing aviators on the C-130 Hercules and the H60 Jayhawk helicopter.
These are the two most common aircraft in the modern Coast Guard aviation fleet and are
the only assets at Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater where there are six C-130 aircraft
and twelve H60 helicopters assigned. Analysis of the results from t-tests performed on
each of the three factors of Crew Coordination, Command Responsibility, and
Recognition of Stressor Effects is detailed in the following sections.
Crew Coordination. Results from the t-tests on crew coordination between the
sample populations of 92 C130 members and 80 H60 aviators did not reveal a significant
difference for the factor as a whole; however, six of the 11 items on the questionnaire did
result in a significant difference of attitude at the 95% confidence interval. On Item 2,
H60 personnel responded in agreement more often with a mean score of 4.73 as
compared to the mean of 4.16 from C130 personnel. These responses resulted in a p
value of .0008 indicating a significant difference in attitude regarding the statement
“Crew members should feel obligated to mention their own psychological stress or
physical problems to other flight crew personnel before or during a flight”. Using a
sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the normalcurve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since the
obtained t-ratio of 3.42 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference
between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher
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can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding
how crewmembers should handle psychological stress or physical issues. Likewise, H60
aviators responded more favorably to Item 8 as well that states “Pilots should be aware of
and sensitive to the personal problems of their crew members”. With a sample size of 92
fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5
percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 3.01
exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference between the means is
significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed
wing and rotary wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding the level to which pilots
need to be aware and sensitive of the personal problems of crewmembers. Item 10 states
that “The pilot flying the aircraft should verbalize plans for procedures or maneuvers and
should be sure that the information is understood and acknowledged by the other crew
members”. Again, H60 crews agreed more frequently with this statement resulting in a ttest p value of .0058 indicating a significant difference in attitudes between the two
samples. Using a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we
use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of
difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.79 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the
observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance.
Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing aviators have
differing attitudes regarding pilot responsibilities in verbalizing plans or procedures.
Item 12 was also agreed with more frequently by H60 personnel resulting in a t-test p
value of .0033 indicating a significant difference in attitude to the statement “Crew
members should alert others to their actual or potential overwork loads”. With a sample
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size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the normal-curve value
of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio
of 2.98 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference between the means is
significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed
wing and rotary wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding crewmember
responsibility to alert others to actual or potential overwork loads. Item 14 states
“Aircraft Commanders should encourage crew members to question procedures during
normal flight operations and emergencies”. Like the previous statements, H60 personnel
responded in agreement with this item more often than their C130 counterparts resulting
in a p value <.0001 indicating a very significant difference in attitude. Using a sample
size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the normal-curve value
of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio
of 4.26 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference between the means is
significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed
wing and rotary wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding the encouragement of
aircraft commanders of crewmembers to question procedures. Item 23 was the only
statement of the eleven item factor wherein C130 personnel responded more in agreement
than did H60 personnel. This item states “The Air craft Commander’s responsibilities
include coordination of cabin crew activities”. C130 personnel responded with a mean
score of 4.48 while H60 aviators had a mean of 3.67 reflected a t-test p value of <.0001
indicating a very significant difference in attitude. Using a sample size of 92 fixed wing
aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to
determine the significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 4.52 exceeds 1.97,
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we can assume that the observed difference between the means is significant at the .05
level of significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed wing and rotary
wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding aircraft commander responsibility of the
aircrew cabin. Data from Factor 1, Communication and Coordination illustrating
attitudes of C130 and H60 aviators is presented below in Table 4.
Table 4
C130 and H60 attitudes on Communication and Coordination.
t-test
Item #
C130
92
H60
80
SD
M
SD
t-ratio
p value
FACTOR M
1
4.16
1.14
4.73
1.03
2
3.42
0.0008
4.84
0.47
4.87
0.52
0.40
0.6916
6
4.76
0.44
4.87
0.35
1.80
0.0743
7
4.12
0.78
4.47
0.74
8
3.01
0.0030
4.56
1.16
4.93
0.26
10
2.79
0.0058
4.72
0.54
4.92
0.28
12
2.98
0.0033
3.32
1.03
4.07
1.28
14
4.26
0.0001
4.68
0.69
4.67
0.62
.10
0.9210
16
4.64
0.57
4.73
0.8
.86
0.3924
21
4.2
0.96
4.33
0.62
1.04
0.3010
22
4.48
1.12
3.67
1.23
23
4.52
0.0001
4.41
0.81
4.57
0.70
1.38
0.0848
Totals
Command Responsibility. Factor 2 titled Command Responsibility included one
item that provided a significant difference in opinion, however the cumulative factor was
not determined to provide a significant difference at the 95% confidence interval
resulting in a .3249 p value from the t-test. Using a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators
and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to
determine the significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of .99 does not exceed
1.97, we can assume that the observed difference between the means is not significant at
the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed wing and
rotary wing aviators do not have significantly differing attitudes regarding command
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responsibility. Only item 11 represented a significant difference resulting in a t-test p
value of <.0001. This item states that “Crew members should not question the decisions
or actions of the Aircraft Commander except when they threaten the safety of the flight”.
C130 aviators agreed with this statement with a mean of 2.83, just below the neutral
score while H60 aviators had a mean score of 2.00 indicating a response of disagree with
this statement. With a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators,
we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of
difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 4.39 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the
observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance.
Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing aviators have
differing attitudes regarding whether crewmembers should question the decisions or
actions of the Aircraft Commander. Results of Factor 2 are detailed in Table 5.
Table 5
C130 and H60 attitudes on Command Responsibility.
Item #
FACTOR
2
9
11
15
18
Totals

C130
M

92
SD

H60
M

80
SD

t-ratio

t-test
p value

3.72
2.80
1.84
2.76
2.78

1.10
1.38
1.07
1.48
1.26

3.62
2.00
2.10
2.67
2.60

1.04
0.93
1.01
1.45
1.11

0.61
4.39
1.63
0.40
0.99

0.5427
0.0001
0.1047
0.6885
0.3249

Recognition of Stressor Effects. This factor investigated the differing opinions
between C130 crews and H60 crews regarding consideration and possible compensation
for stress due to situational adversity. Not only did a t-test of the cumulative scores from
the factor reveal a significant difference at the 95% confidence interval, but three of four
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individual items indicated a significant difference in attitude with C130 crews responding
higher in agreement on each item. Item 13 states “Even when fatigued, I perform
effectively during critical flight maneuvers”. C130 aviators responded with a mean score
of 3.60, while H60 averaged 3.00 resulting in a t-test p value of .0003 indicating a very
significant difference. Using a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing
aviators, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance
of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 3.32 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the
observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance.
Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing aviators have
differing attitudes regarding their recognition of performance while fatigued. Item 24
states “A truly professional crew member can leave personal problems behind while
performing flight duties”. C130 crews responded to this statement with a mean score of
3.80 indicating an agreement with the statement while H60 crews responded with a mean
of 3.07 indicating a neutral opinion of the statement. These scores resulted in a t-test p
value of <.0001 indicating a very significant difference at the 95% confidence interval.
With a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the
normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since
the obtained t-ratio of 3.85 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference
between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher
can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding
how crewmembers should handle personal problems. Finally, Item 25 states “My
decision making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine flying situations”. Again
C130 aviators responded in agreement more frequently resulting in a t-test p value of
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.0006 indicating a significant difference in attitude between the two sample populations.
Using a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary wing aviators, we use the
normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the significance of difference. Since
the obtained t-ratio of 2.64 exceeds 1.97, we can assume that the observed difference
between the means is significant at the .05 level of significance. Therefore the researcher
can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing aviators have differing attitudes regarding
decision making abilities during high and low stress situations. For the factor as a
cumulative sum, C130 crews agreed with a mean of 3.64 and a standard distribution of
1.05 while H60 crew averaged a mean of 3.12 and a standard distribution of 1.3. T-test
analysis revealed a p value of .0017 indicating a very significant difference between the
Crew Resource Management attitudes in the factor of recognition of stressors between
C130 and H60 personnel. Using a sample size of 92 fixed wing aviators and 80 rotary
wing aviators, we use the normal-curve value of 1.97 (5 percent) to determine the
significance of difference. Since the obtained t-ratio of 2.90 exceeds 1.97, we can
assume that the observed difference between the means is significant at the .05 level of
significance. Therefore the researcher can assume that fixed wing and rotary wing
aviators have differing attitudes regarding the recognition of stressor effects. Data from
Factor 3, recognition of stressors from C130 and H60 personnel is provided in Table 6 on
the following page.
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Table 6
C130 and H60 personnel recognition of stressor effects.
Item #
FACTOR
3
13
17
24
25
Totals

C130
M

92
SD

H60
M

80
SD

t-ratio

t-test
p value

3.60
3.08
3.80
0.70
3.64

1.12
1.35
1.04
0.70
1.05

3.00
2.73
3.07
3.67
3.12

1.25
1.22
1.44
1.29
1.30

3.32
1.77
3.85
2.64
2.90

0.0003
0.0444
0.0001
0.0060
0.8131

Summary
Chapter IV provided results of the data collected utilizing the Cockpit
Management Attitudes Questionnaire to determine if there was a significant difference in
the attitudes of pilots and air crew or between H60 and C130 personnel. Multiple t tests
were utilized to determine if a significant difference was observed utilizing the
confidence interval of 95%. Analysis of data indicated that while t-tests of some
individual items produced a t-ratio that was determined to be significant at the 95%
confidence interval, only factor 3 entitled Recognition of Stressor Effects resulted in a
significant difference between C-130 fixed wing aviators and H60 rotary wing aviators.
Chapter V will provide the summary, conclusions and future recommendations related to
this study.
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Chapter V
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The information gathered on Crew Resource Management attitudes and behaviors
are presented. Based on the findings of this study, the research question of if there is a
significant difference in the Crew Resource Management attitudes and beliefs of pilots as
compared to crew members will be discussed as well as the research question of if there
is a significant difference between the attitudes and beliefs of fixed wing aviators as
compared to rotary wing aviators. The conclusions from these research questions will
answer the problem of the study determining if there is a difference in the attitudes on
Crew Resource Management practices of US Coast Guard enlisted flight crew members
to those of pilots to determine if the current blended training is appropriate.

Summary

The purpose of this study is to compare the attitudes on Crew Resource
Management practices of US Coast Guard enlisted flight crew members to those of pilots
to determine if the current blended training is appropriate. This problem was analyzed by
the investigation of two research questions. The first research question of the study asks
is there a significant difference between the Crew Resource Management attitudes and
beliefs of pilots in relation to air crew members. A second research question seeks to
find an answer to the question is there a significant difference between the Crew
Resource management attitudes and beliefs of fixed wing aviators as compared to rotary
wing aviators.
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Due to the overwhelming documentation citing human error as the single largest
contributor to aviation mishaps, it is vitally important that Crew Resource Management
training is as effective as possible. Modern aircraft have advanced to the point where it is
extremely rare that mechanical failure is the cause of an aviation mishap. An estimated
60%-80% of all aviation accidents and mishaps can be attributed to human error
(Freeman & Simmons, 1991). With five class A mishaps resulting in over two million
dollars in damages and/or loss of life and three class B mishaps resulting in over five
hundred thousand dollars as well as the loss of ten Coast Guard aviators in fiscal year
2010, the Coast Guard understands the risks associated with human error as a result of a
breakdown in Crew Resource Management. This study is limited by the fact that Crew
Resource Management training is given to Coast Guard members annually at different
times throughout the year. Therefore, the time since the last refresher training for
participants may vary between one day and twelve months. Another limitation is
presented by the fact that there are multiple Crew Resource Management instructors for
our sample population at Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater. Although the CRM
training curriculum is standardized and there is a course for instructors, instructor
characteristics and styles will vary and may affect the outcome of learning objectives.
For this study the researcher employs a number of assumptions. First it is assumed that
the sample population at Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater is representative of the
Crew Resource Management attitudes and beliefs of aviators throughout the Coast Guard.
Second it is assumed that all respondents have completed an initial Crew Resource
Management training course within the past 12 months or have attended the mandatory
CRM refresher course within the past 12 months. Lastly, it is assumped that all
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respondents are currently on flight orders maintaining a minimum of four flight hours per
month.
The population for this study consisted of all qualified aviators at Coast Guard Air
Station Clearwater. At the time of the study in June of 2014 this totaled 343 aviators of
which 80 were pilots and 263 were enlisted air crew members. All 343 Coast Guard
aviators were provided the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire developed by
Steven Gregorich and Robert Helmreich (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990). One
hundred seventy two members responded to the survey representing 50.1% of the
population. The results of t-tests were used to determine evidence of a significant
difference between Coast Guard pilot and aircrew safety attitudes and behavior in Crew
Resource Management as well as if there were significant differences between those
attitudes and behaviors of C130 and H60 personnel. Survey questions will be asked using
a five-point Likert scale for collection of data in three factors. Those factors included
communication and coordination, command responsibility, and recognition of stressor
effects. The data were analyzed utilizing t-tests to determine if there is a significant
difference for any of the three factors between crew position and airframe.
Conclusions
A discussion of how the Coast Guard is meeting the training needs of independent
crew positions will be presented by analyzing the results of the data collected on the
research questions associated with this study. Research Question 1 of the study asked if
there was a significant difference between the Crew Resource Management attitudes and
beliefs of pilots in relation to air crew members. Research Question 2 investigated the
question if there was a significant difference between the Crew Resource Management
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attitudes and beliefs of fixed wing aviators as compared to rotary wing aviators. An
analysis of the data collected for each question divided into the three factors of
communication and coordination, command responsibility and recognition of stressor
effects is presented in the following sections.
Crew Position
Research Question 1 of this study asks if there is a significant difference between
the Crew Resource Management attitudes and beliefs of pilots compared to aircrew
members.

Data collected on the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire from a

sample of 40 pilots and 132 aircrew members suggests that there is not a significant
difference in these attitudes and beliefs. Of the three factors tested during the study, only
communication and coordination approached the 95% confidence interval to be
considered significant.
The communication and coordination factor t-test resulted in a p value of .0848
and a t-ratio of 1.73, making it not a significant difference. Four items within the eleven
items that comprise Factor 1 however did result in a significant difference and those
items will be discussed here. Item 8 states “Pilots should be aware of and sensitive to the
personal problems of their crew members”. For this item, pilots responded more
favorably with a t-test p value of .0303 making this a significant difference. From this we
can conclude that pilots believe that they should account for the personal issues of the
entire crew more than the crewmembers feel that they should. Item 10 states “The pilot
flying the aircraft should verbalize plans for procedures or maneuvers and should be sure
that the information is understood and acknowledged by the other crew members”. On
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this item, all 40 pilot respondents replied with a response of strongly agree while crew
members responded with a mean score of 4.56. This would suggest that some aircrew
members did not feel strongly that they needed the pilot in command to verbalize all
plans and confirm that they and the rest of the crew understood their responsibility. Item
22 states that “Effective crew coordination requires crew members to take into account
the personalities of other crew members”. This item is closely related with Item 8 and
therefore it is not surprising that pilots agree more frequently resulting in a t-test p value
of .0059. This correlation with Item 8 adds validity evidence that the questionnaire is
correctly evaluating the attitudes of pilots and aircrew members on the factor of
communication and coordination. Although the overall factor did not yield a
significantly different p value at the 95% confidence interval, analysis of individual items
reveals a significant difference between the communication and coordination attitudes of
pilots and aircrew members. This difference is particularly evident on those items related
to the personal problems and personalities of other crew members. One explanation for
this difference could be the extensive leadership training delivered to junior officers as
opposed to the minimal leadership training given to junior enlisted members of the
United States Coast Guard.
Factor 2 of the survey consisted of items on command responsibility. T-test
results of Factor two items resulted in a p value of .5733 and a t-ratio of 0.56 indicating
that there is no significant difference between the CRM attitudes on command
responsibility between pilots and crewmembers. Similar to Factor 1, there are two items
within Factor 2 that represent a significant difference between the attitudes and beliefs on
Crew Resource Management command responsibility between pilots and crewmembers.
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Item 9 states that “The Aircraft Commander should take control and fly the aircraft in
emergency and nonstandard situations”. Crewmembers agreed with this statement more
often than pilots resulting in a mean score of 3.85, at the agree score on the five-point
Likert scale, while pilots had a mean score of 3.38, the neutral score. T-test analysis of
this item resulted in a p value of .0175 indicating a significant difference between the
opinions of the two sample populations. From this we can determine that crewmembers
believe that during emergency and nonstandard situations, the aircraft commander should
assume control of the aircraft while pilots remained neutral on this topic. Item 18 states
“Overall, successful flight deck management is primarily a function of the Aircraft
Commander’s flying proficiency”. On this item pilots agreed more frequently than crew
members with a mean score of 3.08 indicating a neutral response on the five-point Likert
scale while crew members averaged a mean score of 2.56. A t-test of the data collected
on Item 18 revealed a p value of .044, indicating a slightly significant difference at the
95% confidence interval. This data would suggest that pilots believe that effective flight
management is a result of the aircraft commander’s flying proficiency with more
frequency than aircrew members believe this statement to be true.
Factor 3 data resulted in the highest p value scores on the cumulative factor t-test
of all three factors at .8131. This factor evaluates the member’s attitudes towards
recognition of stressor effects featuring items related to consideration and possible
compensation for stress due to situational adversity. The data suggest that there is very
little difference in the attitudes and beliefs between pilots and crewmembers on these
items. We can therefore conclude that the training provided on recognition of stressor
effects is equally effective for both pilots and aircrew members.
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Designated Airframe
Research Question 2 investigates if there is a significant difference in the Crew
Resource Management attitudes and beliefs of fixed wing aviators compared to rotary
wing aviators. Survey items were again separated into the three factors of
communication and coordination, command responsibility, and recognition of stressor
effects. Of these three factors, Factor 3, the recognition of stressor effects resulted in the
greatest statistical difference resulting in t-test p values considered significantly different
on all items within the factor. This result would indicate that attitudes and beliefs on the
recognition of stressor effects are different between airframes and that special
consideration may need to be given to ensuring that each airframe community is
receiving the learning outcomes required.
Factor 1 investigated the opinions of C130 and H60 aviators on the topics of
communication and coordination. A t-test of the cumulative scores from this factor
resulted in a p value of .1708 indicating that there is not a significant difference between
the attitudes and behaviors of C130 and H60 aviators on topics of communication and
coordination. Item analysis however reveals six item that result in a significantly
different p value at the 95% confidence interval. Item 2 states “Crew members should
feel obligated to mention their own psychological stress or physical problems to other
flight crew personnel before or during a flight”. H60 aviators agreed with this statement
more often than C130 members resulting in a mean score of 4.73 for H60 personnel and a
mean score of 4.16 for C130 aviators. This resulted in a t-test p value of .0008 indicating
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a very significant difference. Review of individual items indicates that H60 members
answered more in agreement with items relating to communication and coordination than
C-130 aviators on all but one item. This is likely due to the smaller crew profile
associated with the airframe. While the C130 operates with a standard configuration of
seven personnel, the H60 routinely operates with only three aviators. This configuration
requires that the small crew takes into account the factors of communication and
coordination ensuring that all crew members may perform to their full capacity. Larger
fixed wing crews often mistakenly underestimate the possible errors and complications
that may be presented by not accounting for each individual in regards to communication
and coordination. The only item agreed upon more frequently by C130 personnel that
H60 members was Item 23 that states “The Air craft Commander’s responsibilities
include coordination of cabin crew activities”. This anomaly is likely a result of the fact
that the H60 generally has one individual in the cabin of the aircraft and therefore is
delegated more responsibility. C130 crews routinely fly with a minimum of two
crewmembers in the cabin which unlike the H60 is not visible from the flight deck
making communication and coordination of cabin activities a challenge and priority of
the aircraft commander. The results of the analysis of this factor indicates that a t-test of
Factor 1 responses did not indicate a significant difference between the communication
and coordination attitudes and beliefs of C130 aviators as compared to H60 aviators.
However, there are differences in beliefs between the two sample populations on
individual items that should be addressed through individual training.
Factor 2 investigated attitudes and behaviors related to command responsibility.
This factor resulted in a t-test p value of .3249 that was not determined to be significantly

53

different at the 95% confidence interval. Of the four items included in factor two, only
item 11 resulted in a significant difference between the attitudes and beliefs of C130
members and H60 aviators. Item 11 states “Crew members should not question the
decisions or actions of the Aircraft Commander except when they threaten the safety of
the flight”. While both samples responded below the neutral score, C130 members
agreed with a mean value of 2.8 just below neutral, while H60 members averaged a score
of 2.0 representative of the disagree score on the five-point Likert scale. This indicates
that H60 aviators are more likely to question the decisions of the aircraft commander.
This likely reflects the common crew configuration of more experienced members on the
H60 platform. Whereas the C130 is commonly crewed by two pilots and five enlisted
members, three of whom are very junior, the H60 crew is comprised of two pilots and
one to two enlisted members. This smaller more experienced crew encourages greater
crew coordination and likely impacts the crew’s initiative to question the decisions and
actions of the aircraft commander.
Factor 3 of the survey pertains to items related to the recognition of stressor
effects featuring items related to consideration and possible compensation for stress due
to situational adversity. While this factor represented the least difference between the
attitudes and beliefs of pilots as compared to crew members, it represents the greatest
difference between C130 and H60 aviators. In fact, attitudes and beliefs towards each of
the four items when analyzed using a t-test were determined to be significantly different
at the confidence interval of 95%. Item 13 states “Even when fatigued, I perform
effectively during critical flight maneuvers”. C130 members agreed with statement with
a mean score of 3.60, while H60 members averaged a score of 3.00 indicating a neutral
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score. T-test results indicated a p value of .0003 making this a very significant
difference. Item 17 states that “My performance is not adversely affected by working
with an inexperienced or less capable crew member”. Again, C130 members agreed at a
higher rate just above the neutral score compared to H60 members who averaged a score
below neutral. T-test results for Item 17 resulted in a p value of .0444 indicating a
slightly significant difference. Item 24 states “A truly professional crew member can
leave personal problems behind while performing flight duties”. C130 aviators
responded to this item with a mean score of 3.8 at the agree rating while H60 aviators had
a mean score of 3.07, the neutral rating. This item resulted in a p value of <.0001
indicating a very significant difference. Lastly, Item 25 states “My decision making
ability is as good in emergencies as in routine flying situations”. Similar to the preceding
items, C130 aviators agreed with statement more frequently than H60 personnel resulting
in a mean score of 4.08 while H60 personnel had a mean score of 3.67. The data resulted
in a t-test p value of .0006 indicating a very significant difference at the 95% confidence
interval. Review of this data provides evidence that C130 personnel mistakenly believe
that they can overcome stressors. In fact, even the scores of H60 members appear to be
higher than expected. While the topics of stressors and their effects are core to Crew
Resource Management training, it would appear that the learning outcomes are not being
effectively transferred particularly in the C130 community.
Recommendations
As a result of the findings presented in this study it is reasonable to conclude that
there are significant challenges that affect each of the four represented demographics of
pilots, crew, H60 aviators and C130 aviators. Due to these individual challenges, it is
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recommended that at a minimum portions of Coast Guard Crew Resource Management
training programs should be conducted catering to the specific needs of each individual
demographic. There is evidence that there is a significant difference in the attitudes and
beliefs on Crew Resource Management between each population sample making this
personalized training a necessity to achieve the learning outcomes desired for CRM
training.
One of the assumptions of this study was that the population of aviators at Coast
Guard Air Station Clearwater is representative of the global Coast Guard aviator
population on attitudes and beliefs on Crew Resource Management. Future study
recommendations include evaluating members from other Coast Guard Air Stations.
Additionally, a survey of other government agencies such as the Navy and Air Force
CRM attitudes and beliefs utilizing the CMAQ instrument would provide informative
data on how Coast Guard aviators compare to other services.
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Appendix A

Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes of Coast Guard
Pilots and Flight Crew Members on the topic of Crew Resource Management (CRM)
training programs currently employed by the United States Coast Guard. Multiple
human factors aspects within the scope of Crew Resource Management will be studied
to include teamwork, situational awareness, and overall flight crew safety. Human error
accounts for over 80% of all Naval Aviation mishaps, and of those over 65% can be
attributed to at least one failure in CRM. Crew Resource Management has been
determined by the United States Coast Guard, as well as the world-wide aviation
community, to improve upon safety by eliminating distractors and negative behaviors in
pilots and crew members. The primary focus of the study is to determine if the current
CRM training conducted by the Coast Guard instills and enhances the desired attitudes
and behaviors of aviators and investigate any possible disparity by crew position or
airframe. Analysis of data will be utilized to prescribe recommendations for future
instructional design of Coast Guard Crew Resource Management training.
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Directions: Please respond to the following items by using the following scale to
select your response for each survey question:
A

B

C

D

E

Strongly
Disagree

Slightly Disagree

Neutral

Slightly Agree

Strongly Agree

1. Crew members should avoid disagreeing with others because conflicts create
tension and reduce crew effectiveness.
2. Crew members should feel obligated to mention their own psychological stress
or physical problems to other flight crew personnel before or during a flight.
3. It is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and
techniques of other crew members.
4. Aircraft Commanders should not dictate flight procedures to their copilots.

A

B

C

D

E

Strongly
Disagree

Slightly Disagree

Neutral

Slightly Agree

Strongly Agree

5. Casual, social conversation in the cockpit during periods of low workload can
improve crew coordination.
6. Each crew member should monitor other crew members for signs of stress or
fatigue and should discuss the situation with the crew member.
7. Good communications and crew coordination are as important as technical
proficiency.
8. Pilots should be aware of and sensitive to the personal problems of their crew
members.
9. The Aircraft Commander should take control and fly the aircraft in emergency
and nonstandard situations.
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10. The pilot flying the aircraft should verbalize plans for procedures or maneuvers
and should be sure that the information is understood and acknowledged by
the other crew members.
11. Crew members should not question the decisions or actions of the Aircraft
Commander except when they threaten the safety of the flight.
12. Crew members should alert others to their actual or potential overwork loads.
13. Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical flight maneuvers.
14. Aircraft Commanders should encourage crew members to question procedures
during normal flight operations and emergencies.
15. There are no circumstances (except total incapacitation) where the copilot
should assume command of the aircraft.
16. A debriefing and critique of procedures and decisions after each flight is an
important part of developing and maintaining effective crew coordination.
17. My performance is not adversely affected by working with an inexperienced or
less capable crew member.
18. Overall, successful flight deck management is primarily a function of the Air
craft Commander’s flying proficiency.
19. Training is one of the Aircraft Commander’s most important responsibilities.
20. Because individuals function less effectively under high stress, good crew
coordination is more important in emergency and abnormal situations.
A

B

C

D

E

Strongly
Disagree

Slightly Disagree

Neutral

Slightly Agree

Strongly Agree

21. The pre-flight crew briefing is important for safety and for effective crew
management.
22. Effective crew coordination requires crew members to take into account the
personalities of other crew members.
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23. The Air craft Commander’s responsibilities include coordination of cabin crew
activities.
24. A truly professional crew member can leave personal problems behind while
performing flight duties.
25. My decision making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine flying
situations.
26. What aircraft do you currently fly on?
27. What is your crew position?
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Appendix B
Cover Letter

This survey is part of the research for a Graduate Research Project for completion of the
Master of Secondary Education Instructional Design and Technology at Old Dominion
University.
Participation in the survey will take approximately 15 minutes. 25 Survey questions will
assess cockpit management attitudes. The data collected will be used to determine
Crew Resource Management training effectiveness as well as indicate any differences in
safety attitudes and behaviors between crew position and airframe. This data will be
used to make recommendations for future instruction of Crew Resource Management
training to increase flight safety for Coast Guard Aviators. The success of this study is
reliant upon your participation.
You are not required to participate in this study, and may withdraw at any time. Data
will be collected anonymously and will not be linked to consent forms or email.
If you should have any questions, please feel free to contact AETC Greg Stewart at
gstew010@odu.edu

If you agree to participate in this study, please access the survey at
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/F9YHHKC

